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An old man from Kathlehongi "I thought we are to
inherit the new South Africa - all of us, including we
the illiterate blacks and these stupid boers at these
factories in Alberton. But none of us understands the
debates." (April 1992, referring to the C0DE8A
negotiations).
A SASCO studenti "At the national political level, the
advent of the negotiations has seen a continuous
marginalisation of the masses of our people. Instead
of playing a central role in shaping the direction the
struggle takes in the era of negotiations, the masses
found themselves sidelined." (from an unpublished
discussion document, May 1994).
Mac Maharaj, leading ANC negotiator and now Minister
of Transporti "We are on the threshold of achieving
our lifetime's objectives...We have put national unity
and reconciliation on the forefront of the first
government...Those achievements are what the people
wanted and what the people gave their lives for." (The
Star. 1 May 1994).
Since May 1990 the ANC-led liberation movement has been engaged
in a protracted transition process in which April's elections
were a decisive moment, but only a moment. In the first 25 months
of the negotiation process, if one begins with the May 1990 ANC-
De Klerk government meeting at Groote Schuur, the liberation
movement drifted strategically, tactically and organisationally
(see Cronin 1992). Some of this drift was due to a deliberate,
double agenda strategy from the incumbent regime. It was
negotiating with the ANC, but it was simultaneously destabilising
it. But the drift was also due to internal difficulties, the
complex process of forging some kind of unity out of an ANC
emerging from jail, the underground, an often distant and lengthy
exile, and from the mass struggles of the 1970s and 80s. There
were disjunctures in age and in political culture. Some had been
soldiers or diplomats for decades, others had been the core
cadreship of social movements. Although the fault-lines of this
diversity are still visible within the ANC, from around mid-1992
the movement has, in fact, done relatively well - negotiation-
wise, election-wise, and in terms of developing a fairly coherent
Reconstruction and Development Programme - which, of course,
remains to be implemented.
This relative success has been forged, sometimes with the aid of,
but often in despite of the dominant and popular paradigm within
which the movement's leadership, some tens of thousands of
activist cadres and a wider popular support base have,
traditionally, thought about change. The success has also been
won by means judged impossible (or is it impermissible?) by the
now globally ubiquitous paradigm, the neo-liberal "transition to
democracy" model.
To some extent, practice has outpaced broader strategic thinking.
There are plenty of lonely paradigmatic categories out there.
Some activists still parade them ceremoniously, but without the
ring of conviction. Others have dumped the old categories, but
in an unresolved way as they plunge into ad hoc politics. I
believe that this dual situation, relative success in the midst
of a relative failure of the grand narratives, partially accounts
for the current activist mood - both euphoric, and profoundly
sceptical (the conflicting Maharaj and SASCO quotes in the
epigraphs above are fairly representative).
The challenge is to find better ways of conceptualising the
process in which we are involved, and thereby to sharpen our
sense of strategic purpose.
Transition to democracy
One way of conceptualising our situation is in terms of the neo-
liberal "transition to democracy" paradigm (see, inter alia.
O'Donnel et al. 1986, Huntington 1993, Adam & Moodley 1993, Du
Toit 1990, and Van Zyl Slabbert 1992). This approach locates the
South African transition as part of a global phenomenon, the
"third wave" of democratisation - the negotiated shift from
authoritarian regimes to some kind of multi-party democracy.
There are certainly some strengths in this approachi
* it introduces useful comparative material (and in the
liberation movement we have often been slow to learn from
a study of transitions in Brazil, the Philippines or El
Salvador, for instance);
* it helps to explain why, on some issues at least, there
is a very broad national and international consensus on a
negotiated transition to democracy in South Africa at this
time in our history. (It also, of course, simultaneously
obscures the very different, including class, agendas and
expectations at play within the partial consensus).
* more than other dominant paradigms, it draws attention to
the need for practical, tactical and medium-term engagement
with the transition process. It thinks change (sometimes it
conjures up the appearance of change> in the context of a
complex balance of forces.
But this model is not, of course, an innocent and merely
descriptive set of generalisations based on comparative studies -
as it likes to present itself. I will deal with some of its
problematic prescriptions, particularly as they have been applied
to South Africa, in a moment. First, it is useful to locate this
general theoretical paradigm within shifting imperialist
politico-military strategic thinking.
Low Intensity democracy
In many ways the "transition to democracy" literature reflects
changing imperialist strategies towards third world (and, of
course, now also the former second world) countries. In saying
this, I do not want to suggest that the literature (whose
institutional bases are largely academic and para-academic) is
narrowly part of some grand "imperialist conspiracy". But I am
convinced that one cannot understand the theory unless it is
located in terms of strategic shifts in the approach to the third
world by imperialist governments over the last two and a half
decades.
These shifts have__gone through two major steps after the
strategic defeat of the United States in Vietnam at the beginning
of the 1970s. The first shift was to "Vietnamise" third world
struggles. This meant massive political and military support for
regional authoritarian regimes - Thieu in Vietnam; the Shah and
the Zionist regime in the Middle East; Vorster and PW Botha in
southern Africa; Somoza in central America; Marcos in the
Philippines, etc. But, by the end of the 1970s, these regional
powers were proving to be increasingly unstable. They were the
targets and often the direct cause of growing mass and guerrilla
movements. Some of these regimes (notably those of Thieu, the
Shah, and Somoza) failed to see the decade out.
Without abandoning local military proxy forces (now increasingly
deployed in terms of a "low intensity warfare" doctrine (see
Klare and Kornbluh 1987), there was a further strategic shift.
US administrations began encouraging transitions to "democracy"
in third world countries. They progressively withdrew full
support from their own dictators, or pressured them to "reform",
while building pro-imperialist "centrist" political alliances.
The strategy was to blunt the edge of national liberation
movements and mass struggles (for a similar account see Gills,
et al.. 1993, p.7-16).
These changes in imperialist politico-military strategy were also
closely connected to major changes in the world' capitalist
system. From the early 1970s the capitalist system has become
increasingly global in character (Brecher, Childs and Cutler,
1993). Indeed, as a number of commentators have begun to note,
its globalism was more widespread than was, perhaps, immediately
apparenti
"In the 1970s, the same export-import-led growth
strategies were adopted by Communist Party-led
governments in the East (Poland, Romania, Hungary) and
military dictatorships in the South (Argentina,
Brazil, Chile). In the 1980s, the same debt service
policies on the IMF model were adopted and implemented
by Communist Party-led governments in the East
(Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia) and by military
dictatorships, other authoritarian government, and
their successor democratic government in the South
(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines)... The
political irony is that 'actually existing socialism'
failed not least because of the unsuccessful
implementation of import/export-led growth models and
IMF-style austerity policies in the East. 'Actually
existing capitalism' pursued the same models and
policies in the South and also failed." (Frank, p.41
and 44)
In the past two and a half decades, domination has been exerted
more and more through financial mechanisms imposed by bodies like
the IMF, World Bank and GATT. "Democratisation" in the third
world has often been motivated by the belief in imperialist
circles that elected centrist (or even left) governments would
have more legitimacy in imposing the bitter pill of structural
adjustment programmes on their own third world populations.
The economic stagnation in the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the
eventual collapse in 1989-91 strengthened the case of those
strategists advocating less reliance on Cold War regional
dictatorships to shore up imperialism. Within South Africa, the
timing of FW De Klerks's move to unban the ANC, SACP and PAC and
engage in negotiations was not accidental. In fact, in the
historic speech in February 1990 in which these measures were
announced, De Klerk specifically referred to the collapse in
eastern Europe as a reason "allowing" for "democratisation" in
South Africa. He was tacitly admitting that he was not a democrat
by conviction, but by circumstance.
A third, and certainly more positive factor behind the change in
imperialist third world strategies is related to the social
developments within the advanced capitalist countries themselves.
Globalisation has seen the partial deindustrialisation of the
north, and the rapid growth of new middle strata (white collar
workers, a massive tertiary student population, new professions).
Globalisation has also produced mass unemployment in the north,
and large immigrant populations, economic refugees from the
South. These diverse strata have been an important base out of
which a host of new social movements have emerged (anti-war,
youth and student, feminist, greens, progressive religious
movements, black power, etc.). These strata and movements have
also been active in various international solidarity movements -
not least the world-wide anti-apartheid movement. They have had
an increasingly important and generally progressive impact on
imperialist international policy.
It is out of the contradictory influence of these factors (AND
ongoing mass struggles waged by third world peoples) that the
widespread trend to negotiated transitions to democracy in the
third world needs to be understood. Certainly, our strategic
opponents are trying to locate the South African transition with
these kinds of bearings. As a South African left we have to
engage with this reality.
In doing so, we do not have some of the advantages of our
strategic opponents. There is now an extensive neo-liberal
tactical and strategic literature to guide the would-be third
world liberal reformer. "Managing change" (which happens to be
the title of a recent book by Jan Steyn) is a phrase that occurs
fairly often in this tactical-strategic literature - and the
subliminal flip-side of the phrase is: "without changing the
management".
Managing change...without changing the management
The great challenge for third world, neo-liberal reformers is,
according to the literature, to retain the strategic initiative
within the transition. The twin dangers aret
* outrunning their own constituency, thus losing the
initiative to right-wing anti-reform forces; and
* opening up too quickly to the demands of the popular
forces, and becoming engulfed in a tide of rising popular
expectation and mobilisation.
How is the neo-liberal reformer to avoid these twin dangers?
Essentially, the negotiated transition has to be managed as a
process of elite pacting. Elites, capable of "delivering" major
constituencies, jointly manage the transition to a new
constitutional dispensation. In the process, a new centrist bloc
is consolidated and right and left forces are marginalised.
This is, incidentally, a reading into which neo-liberal
commentators are now trying to squeeze the recent South African
electionsi
"In seven exhilarating days, South Africa became
hostile territory for the radicals and ideologues of
the Left and Right. A new country, with a distinctive
thrust to its politics was born...The radical Left, in
the form of the PAC, was devastated.. .the Radical
Right in the form of the Freedom Front was contained
to a mere 2,9 percent..." (Hugh Roberton, "Radicals
left out in the cold", The Star. 4 Hay, 1994). (See
also a similar editorial analysis in BeeId, May 2,
1994, in which the PAC'a electoral performance is said
to show that "South Africans are tired of
revolutionary parties.")
In many respects, the transition in this paradigm is designed to
demobilise the populace. In the words of Huntington (an
influential proponent of the model)! "In democratization the
sequence of dominant public attitudes might be described as first
euphoria, then disillusionment, then resignation and acceptance."
(1993, p.11). It is a sequence of which he clearly approves.
Patently, the democracy towards which the transition is supposed
to move is an extremely limited democracy ("low intensity
democracy").
All of this la fairly transparent in the South African writers
who have seized upon the "transition to democracy" literature,
applying it with particular enthusiasm. The most coherent
explication of the model is in Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert's The
Quest for Democracy. South Africa in Transition (1992). Slabbert
tells us, for instance, that <
"One of the most daunting challenges facing [a future
government of national unity] is to protect the new
political space created by negotiations from being
used to contest the historical imbalances that
precipitated negotiation in the first place..."
(p.90).
What on earth is the use of "new political space" if it cannot
be used to overcome the dreadful social, economic, cultural and
moral "historical imbalances" with which we are being left? For
Slabbert, democracy is a thin democracy, simply a basic set of
formal rules, and we should not "burden democracy" (the title of
Slabbert's Jan Smuts Memorial Lecture to the SA Institute of
International Affairs, 22 Nay 1992) with popular aspirations.
Popular aspirations are a threat to elite pacting on the
"democratic" rules of the game. Jan Steyn tells us that the
transition to democracy in Namibia is going smoothly because
"SWAPO has not had to face highly mobilised internal civilian
constituencies." (1990, p.98).
Mass Involvement - the unthinkable
Mo wonder our local neo-liberal transition theorists were thrown
into a particular spin by the ANC-alliance's rolling mass action
campaigns of June-August 1992. The impossible/impermissible was
happening. Stanley Uys wrote at the times "What mass action has
done...has been to democratise ANC involvement in
negotiations..." That sounds like a compliment, surely? But no,
this democratising of the ANC's involvement in negotiations, Uys
goes on, has merely "made agreements so much more difficult to
reach...The longer the ANC engages in mass action, the more the
country can kiss goodbye to fruitful negotiations." (The_star,
July 30, 1992.) "Democratisation" and "fruitful negotiations"
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are, from the vantage point of neo-liberal transition theory,
mutually contradictory.
Bow on earth will South Africa reach a new dispensation, asked
the same Stanley Uys in The star in mid-August 1992, "unless
elites on either side arrange it, as they usually do in history?"
The longing for elite bargaining was all over the centre pages
of the liberal newspapers at the time. Consider some of the
headlines to political columns in mid-1992t "NEEDEDi A COUNCIL
OF THE WISE" (Lawrence Schlemmer, The Star. July 28); "WHERE ARE
OUR STATESMEN?" (Van Zyl Slabbert, The Star. July 31); "WHAT WE
NEED IS THREE WISE MEN" (Alex Boraine, The Star. Aug 7); "KING
RULES, OR BARONS, OR THE UPSTARTS TAKE OVER" (Ken Owen, Sunday
Times. July 26). Scratch the surface of our neo-liberals and you
find feudal sentiments I
Contrary to their dire predictions, the rolling mass action of
1992 proved to be immensely positive, from the point of view of
a more thorough-going negotiated democratisation after the
breakdown of the COOESA round of negotiations. Indeed, through
the last three years, the process has been considerably mass-
driven. Besides the June-August 1992 mass actions (producing the
September 1992 Record of Understanding and breaking De Klerk's
strategic alliance with the IFP), there have been other major
points in which mass mobilisation produced qualitative breaksi
* the COSATU-led November 1991 two-day stayaway against the
government's unilateral introduction of VAT. The stayaway
reasserted the relative independence of mass democratic
formations like the unions, it challenged the government's
increasing unilateralism and impacted upon the whole
negotiated transition;
* the massive mobilisation in April 1993, after Chris
Hani's assassination, which resulted, tragically but
factually, in a broad national commitment to an April 1994
election date;
* the mass uprising in Bophuthatswana which played a major
role, not just in opening up a large part of our country to
a freer and fairer election process, but in deepening the
political disintegration of the anti-transition "Freedom
Alliance". It deprived the white extreme right-wing of an
intended military rear-base, adjacent to their zones of
platteland strength.
negotiations and mass Involvement
The "transition to democracy" paradigm tends to oppose mass
involvement and fruitful negotiation. This polarity has also
often been accepted, if inverted, by AMC activist ranks -
"negotiations have broken down/ or negotiations are a waste of
time, let'8 suspend them and get back to the streets". This
simple opposition is wrong. In the first place, as Adam and
Moodley point out, even in the midst of the suspended CODESA
negotiations and the mass actions of mid-1992, "forty-three
informal meetings took place between the ANC's general secretary,
Cyril Ramaphosa, and the government's chief negotiator, Roelf
Meyer." (p.63). Adam and Moodley refer to these meetings (which
were not strictly informal, they were meetings of a mandated
"channel" group), in order to recuperate their paradigm. The
meetings are held up as evidence of the mere "posturing" to which
they try to reduce the mass campaign. But it was the combination
of mass mobilisation and "elite" (and popular) negotiations that
paved the way for the September 1992 breakthrough.
Not noticed by Adam and Moodley is the fact that, despite the
suspension of the formal multi-party negotiations, there were
probably more negotiations in the June-August 1992 period than
at any other time in our history. Apart from Ramaphosa/Meyer
meetings, and the UN Security Council's Cyrus Vance mission,
almost every localised mass campaign (and there were thousands
countrywide) resulted in negotiations. Typically, in rural areas
for instance, a march from the township into the "white" town,
or the occupation of a town facility, would raise the main
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national negotiating demands, but also local concerns, the right
to use town venues for meetings, a demand for the transfer of a
particularly notorious police officer, and so forth. These were
often not one-off processes, they frequently gave birth to, or
revitalised local negotiating forums (dispute resolution
structures, development forums, etc.)- National negotiations had
become complex and remote, and the old man from Kathlehong quoted
in the epigraph at the beginning of this paper was speaking for
millions of others. In the midst of the rolling mass actions of
mid-1992, in thousands of localities countrywide, communities
were claiming the terrain of negotiated transition for themselves
(see Cronin 1992a).
These dynamics were again in evidence in the mass actions of
April-June 1993, following Chris Hani's assassination. This was
particularly the case in the Eastern Transvaal where a 19-day
(Nay 17-June 5) consumer boycott of white shops was launched. An
Eastern Transvaal regional tripartite assessment of the struggle
is worth quoting at some lengthi
"The boycott was called in the wake of the
assassination of comrade Chris Hani. The main issues
of the boycott werei
* to register the anger of hundreds of thousands of
people in the region at cde Chris's slaying;
* an early announcement of an election date and a
speedy transition to democracy;
* local and regional demands...
Originally, the alliance had planned to target the
businesses of extreme right-wingers in the white community.
The object was to isolate the most reactionary forces.
However, we found we lacked information about the white
community. He didn't know who was who. This, in itself,
reflects the situation in the Eastern Transvaal, where
baasskap has remained deeply entrenched. There has been
virtually no engagement, ho talking between the townships
and the white communities. The boycott has begun to reverse
this. Right from the start, the boycott organisers kept
their door open. They were always prepared to engage
business-people and local authorities in discussion. By the
second week the white community was calling for meetings in
dozens of localities.
The boycott organisers took the decision to engage
organised business, the provincial authorities and the
security forces on a regional basis. On June 5, the
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ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance met with SACOB, the Sakekamer, the
Afrikaans Handelsinstituut, Eskom, the Transvaal Provincial
Administration, the Regional Services Council, and the SADF
and SAP.
The meeting was a major breakthrough. A joint statement
agreed on<
* joint action to ensure a speedy transition to
democracy;
* security forces and government to take firm action
against security force members and others interfering
with free political activity;
* a joint tripartite alliance/SADF delegation to
verify the de-electrification of the SA/Mozambique
border fence...
* the phasing out of the inhumane bucket system, still
prevalent in a number of townships in the region. This
system is to be replaced with flushing toilets. Joint
alliance and RSC subcommittees will be established to
oversee this process;
* reactivating steps to establish a Regional Economic
Forum.
It has also been agreed that review meetings will occur
every 60 days to assess progress in all these areas."
(ANC/SACP/COSATU 1993)
Of course, whether at local, regional or national level, not
everything agreed upon necessarily gets implemented. Once the
heat is off, there is deliberate obstruction from the other side,
or the mass-based structures lack the capacity to follow through
on negotiated victories. But even allowing for some slippage, the
Eastern Transvaal report captures the best of the transitional
process over the last four years. And it is precisely this kind
of process that points the way forward to an effective strategy
for deepening democratisation, for popular self-empowerment in
a mass-driven process of structural reform in the coming months
and years.
However, what is described in the Eastern Transvaal report is
simply impossible/impermissible within the "transition to
democracy" paradigm. Then again, how adequate to thinking this
kind of strategy are our own traditional paradigms of change?
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National liberation
It is national liberation/decolonisation/nation building that
remains, often in a rather vague way, the dominant paradigm
within the broad ANC-led alliance. The national liberation
paradigm contains many positive features, and these have
generally been reinforced by the influence of marxist thought on
the ANC. Anti-imperialist, nation-building based on socio-
economic transformation, and popular mobilisational traditions
are a strong antidote to negative features within the neo-liberal
"democratisation" paradigm.
The liberation paradigm also helps to explain our relative
advantage in assembling a majority project, including a majority
electoral project, compared to countries which in many other
respects resemble South Africa (for instance, Brazil, El
Salvador, South Korea or Mexico - see Seidman 1993). Although the
ANC fought the April elections quite considerably on a social and
economic transformation programme and not just on populism, in
many ways it won these elections as a national liberation
movement, representing a racially oppressed majority. For
millions of ANC voters, the commitment to casting a ballot in the
face of great difficulties, had a great deal to do with the sense
of a "liberation" moment. The very resonance of the liberation
paradigm was, of course, one of the prime reasons De Klerk had
been so anxious to dismiss the decolonisation model in the South
African situation (who wants to be Ian Smith?).
However, there are certain ways of understanding national
liberation which are not helpful to understanding the present
transition process, or to promoting an effective struggle to
deepen democratisation in the coming years. These unhelpful ways
of understanding national democratic change have been reinforced
by tendencies in the body of theory that came to be codified (in
the Stalin years) as "marxism-leninism". In what follows I
propose to consider some of these negative assumptions, pointing
out also their interconnections.
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Liberation teleology
The "irreversibility", the "inevitability" of the
liberation/decolonisation process has been profoundly anchored
within popular thinking and organisational strategising in South
Africa. Indeed, once upon a time events themselves made it hard
to resist the notion of falling dominos, in which colonial
regimes seemed to be collapsing in a southbound knock-on ripple.
To be sure, there have been times in which the South African
liberation movement has criticised this domino theory,
underlining the interconnectedness, complexity and simultaneity
of our different struggles. These polemics were particularly
strong when domino thinking led to a atageist approach to the
southern Africa struggle ("don't rock the boat in South Africa,
let us first consolidate in Zimbabwe or Mozambique, etc.") - see,
for instance, "What the Nkomati Accord Means for Africa",
Editorial Notes, The African Communist, no.98, 3rd quarter 1984.
But we cannot deny falling into teleological domino thinking
ourselves. Certainly at a popular, more or less spontaneous level
this tendency has been pronounced and in many respects positive.
The "winds of change" mood played a role in the mass
mobilisations of the late 1950s and early 1960s. There was also
a major impact on the popular mood made by events in Angola and
particularly Mozambique in 1974-5, an impact which played its
part in the 1976 uprisings (Brooks & Brickhill 1980). The idea,
and partial reality, of a southbound ripple of falling colonial
dominos has also impacted deeply, and generally to our own
benefit, on the morale of our opponents.
This popular sense of a southbound wave has also been present in
more theoretically elaborated discourse. The first two sections
in the SACP's 1962 programme (The Road to South African Freedom)
are a case in point. The second of these sections is entitled,
significantly, "The African Revolution". The very notion of a
singular "African Revolution" is itself part of the tendency
towards teleologyt
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"The colonial system of imperialism is crumbling. The
peoples of practically the whole continent of Asia have
within an increasingly short space of time liberated
themselves from direct colonial rule. The tide of national
liberation has advanced with equally dramatic swiftness
throughout the continent of Africa..." (SACP 1981, p.289).
Whatever the positive, mobilisational implications of this
teleology, it has led to serious strategic miscalculations by the
liberation movement, in particular in the way in which the armed
struggle was conceptualised in the early 1960s. Strategic
thinking from our side greatly underestimated the resolve and
capacity of the ruling bloc within our country, and it8 external
supporters, and greatly overestimated the impact of launching the
armed struggle (Barrell 1990, and Fine fc Davis 1990, ch.10). A
too simplistic assumption of an "inevitable" and "irreversible"
process of decolonisation can lead to political voluntarism, and
above all to an inability to cope with a complex and uneven
process that includes reverses.
More seriously*
Teleology leads to substitutlonism
Teleology also has a habit of encouraging vanguardism, where the
"vanguard" is an elite that "knows where history is going". And
this easily prepares the ground for substitutionism, the
movement/party substitutes for the people/class, on the grounds
of greater insight into history's inevitable outcome; the upper
echelons of the movement substitute for the rank-and-file; and,
once in power, bureaucratic structures, or even the Leader,
displace the movement/party, not to mention the people in whose
name state power is exercised. These tendencies are crystallised
in Tom Mboya's vainglorious, but not untypical, claim that the
liberation movement is "the mouthpiece of an oppressed nation and
its leader embodies the nation." (quoted in Ottaway 1991, p.65).
These tendencies have often also been fostered by material
conditions. In many of the more progressive national liberation
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movements on our continent, the main force in the struggle has
been a peasant army. The upper echelons of the movement acquire
a politico-military character, and reproduce a cadreship of
administrators, diplomats, negotiators and army officers. Post-
independence, the upper echelons of the movement shift into
government (the "transfer of power"), while the largely peasant
rank-and-file of the liberation army is either demobilised back
into an often remote countryside, or transformed into a regular
army to meet the threat of military destabilisation. These
realities are, incidentally, exactly the reason why Jan Steyn,
from his neo-liberaL. perspective, believes that the transition
process in Namibia is assured of successi "the war [in Namibia]
was, in an immediate sense, external to the major developed areas
of that country. Hence the population had not become radicalised
by widespread internal struggle." (1990, p.98)
Quite apart, then, from the subjective political inclinations of
the new political ruling stratum (and they are characteristically
diverse as they evolve over time), for social reasons they have
often lost a mobilised base with which to counter the apparently
dissolved colonial power. This colonial power quickly returns in
a neo-colonial form - as a low intensity war, as a host of
foreign NGOs and funding agencies, maybe as blue helmeted UN
troops, and, above all, as a structural adjustment programme.
The post-colonial African state, regardless of its political
orientation, has been marked by a relatively high level of
independence from society. This is partly because, in the
progressive cases, as I have argued, the peasant liberation army
is demobilised. It is also partly because the institutions of
civil society are very often not "national", but "ethnic",
"regionalist", "tribal". The national state then assumes
considerable autonomy, and national politics often has an
unstable (coups and plots within the narrow bureaucratic elite)
and voluntaristic character. There is, of course, a substantial
literature on this topic (see, inter alia. First 1971, Saul 1979,
and Alavi 1982).
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Fortunately, the South African liberation struggle has been
different in its social composition, in the major localities in
which it has been waged (schools, factories, townships - both
urban and rural), and in the character of the major mass
formations (trade unions and other sectoral and community based
mass organisations). The ANC-alliance's Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP) expressly recognises these realities,
and sees, the RDP as not just a state-delivery programme, but one
requiring the active mobilisation, reorganisation and
participation of mass and community based organisations.
In South Africa we have relative objective advantages, but we
also need to understand them, because our own theoretical
paradigm can easily seduce us into a post-independence
substitutionism, a demobilisation of our mass formations. From
the left within our movement, a confused and reluctant
marginalisation might occur, because of an earlier tendency to
see mass action as essentially insurrectionary in character and
hence the often repeated queryi "now that we have got an ANC
government, how can the ANC march on the ANC?" From the right,
within and without the ANC, the tendencies to encourage
demobilisation of the social movements is even more pronounced
("they will frighten away foreign investment", "we had mass
struggle, because we didn't have the vote").
Substitutionism thinks change as a transfer, not a
transformation of power
Liberation teleology and substitutionism are closely linked to
another potential weakness of the national liberation paradigm.
It tends to think political transition as a "transfer", rather
than as a "transformation of power". At its most venal this kind
of transfer is virtually little more than a change of symbols and
personalities, what Chris Hani used to describe as a "flag and
anthem independence".
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Obviously, no progressive national liberation movement on our
continent has ever espoused that venal view. Indeed, the very act
of waging a progressive liberation struggle has demanded, long
before the critical moment of transition, that power relations
be transformed. Revolutionary writers, as diverse as Fanon and
Cabral, have written perceptively about this. Especially where
colonial resistance has been most obdurate (Algeria, the former
Portuguese colonies, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa itself),
sustained popular mobilisation has been essential, and this
mobilisation has been forced to address a transformative project
in order to mobilise effectively. Traditional power relations,
between colonised men and women, between chiefs and commoners,
between different ethnic groups and classes among the oppressed,
all have had to be consciously addressed. Cabral liked to say
that the liberation struggle itself was a liberator for its
participants.
But the transformative project, particularly post-independence,
has tended to be a socio-economic project. The process of
political democratisation has been less elaborated.
"The dominant tendencies in the popular and radical
movements of national liberation were more marked by
a progressive social content than by the democratic
beliefs of their militants, despite the sometimes
ritualistic use of the term 'democracy'...I do not
believe it is a caricature to say that the peasant
soldier of the liberation army entering Peking in 1949
was thinking of land reform, but as yet unaware of the
meaning of democracy." (Amin 1993, p.70-1).
All of these tendencies (teleology, voluntarism, aubstitutionism)
foster the belief that political struggle is about a decisive
moment - the transfer of power (in the national liberation mode),
the seizure of state power (in the not entirely dissimilar
"marxist-leninist" mode), in which the vanguard takes control of
the "commanding heights", abolishes all opposition, and then
implements a socio-economic transformation, frog-marching history
towards its foregone conclusion.
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Th« all-in moment
There are certainly decisive moments, qualitative break-throughs
(and reverses), ruptures, and unevenness. History and the
political process are not seamless or merely incremental
evolutions. In critiquing the neo-liberal "transition to
democracy" model in South Africa, I have already mentioned three
or four decisive moments in the last four years, points of
critical, if partial, rupture. These include mid-1992, the weeks
after Hani's assassination on April 10 1993, the Bophuthatswana
uprising in March 1994, and surely April's elections themselves.
But these decisive moments of partial rupture, moments in which
there are qualitative shifts in the balance of forces, are not
the same as some all-consuming moment, some thaumaturgical event,
in which your political opponent disappears from the face of the
earth.
Yet, from within the national liberation (and "marxist-leninist")
paradigms there are powerful tendencies to subordinate all
political practice to the pursuit of just such an all-in moment.
In the last four years the PAC (which sometimes sounds like the
uncensored libido of the ANC) often marginalised itself,
disengaging itself from reality by measuring all political
activity against the one great moment. In the months after the
issuing of the 1989 Harare Declaration, the PAC president, Zeph
Mothopeng saidi
"Our liberation, the liberation of the African worker,
cannot be negotiated, it will be attained. You cannot go to
a negotiation table for your liberation. When you go to the
negotiating table you must already have won your
liberation." (Sowetan, 20 November 1989; see also Rantete
1992)
The attitude persisted into 1990/1, with the PAC boycotting the
negotiations, asserting that the only purpose for negotiations
would be for the regime "to negotiate its surrender and the
transfer of power." Bennny Alexander, PAC secretary general
explainedi "there is no way negotiation can be regarded as a
panacea for all our social malaise. Therefore it is bound to
fail." (Indicator SA. vol.7, no.3, 1990). Politics is the pursuit
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of the panacea, anything short of everything is a sell-out. You
will find similar, although usually much more nuanced tendencies
in the ANC.
Indeed, on both sides of the debate that erupted within the ANC
around negotiations strategy and "sunset" clauses in the second
half of 1992, the logic of an all-in moment persisted. Joe Slovo,
in arguing for negotiations compromises writesi
"There was certainly never a prospect of forcing the
regime's unconditional surrender across the table. It
follows that the negotiating table, is neither the sole
terrain of the struggle for power nor the place where it
will reach its culminating point." (Slovo 1992, p.36, my
emphasis.)
While I do not disagree with the main tactical point Slovo was
trying to make, I think there is still a hint of the old paradigm
of a "culminating point". Slovo makes room for his proposed
negotiation compromises by deferring "the decisive moment" (of
"unconditional surrender"?). He does not, therefore, think
through the fuller strategic implications of his practice, which
is perhaps also why he did not, in this extremely influential
paper, begin to develop a wider strategy for the transition,
beyond a negotiations strategy.
Slovo'a most articulate opponent in the 1992 debate, Pallo
Jordan, summarises the standard national liberation South African
paradigm with some precision. He does this in three propositions,
which are worth scrutinyi
1. "Since the adoption of the document 'ANC Strategy and
Tactics' by the Morogoro Conference of 1969 the ANC has
held the view that the contradiction between the colonised
Black majority and the White oppressor state is the most
visible and dominant within South Africa."
2. "It has further argued that this contradiction cannot be
solved by the colonial state 'reforming itself out of
existence'. and consequently, only struggle to overthrow
the system of colonial domination could lead to the
resolution of that contradiction."
3. "Moreover, it has been the ANC view that since the
colonial state and the colonised people cannot be spatially
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separated, there ia no possibility of the two co-existing.
In the South African context, this necessarily meana that
the struggle must result in the destruction of the colonial
state." (Jordan 1992, p.7).
Proposition two contains an interesting, and symptomatic elision.
I agree that it was/is unlikely that the colonial state should
ever reform itself out of existence. You might, perhaps, argue
that this is precisely the neo-liberal agenda of De Klerk. But
Jordan is certainly right if we allow him to mean that a neo-
liberal "democratisation" is not going to resolve the fundamental
contradiction of a white minority and an oppressed black
majority. But Jordan counterposes self-reform (which he declares
to be impossible) to a struggle for overthrowal (which is said
to be the only progressive possibility). If overthrowing happens
to be an objective or conjunctural impossibility, where does that
leave us? Do we disengage from the transition process, and
accumulate our forces externally for a decisive moment? What is
elided is another possibility: a mass-driven transition, in which
we engage actively with the process in order to progressively
transform, which is to say - abolish, in a process of structural
reforms, the colonial state.
Jordan's elision of this possibility (the only progressive
possibility in our situation, and what we are actually doing) is
further deepened by his third proposition. I am not sure exactly
what he means when he argues that the colonial state and the
colonised people cannot co-exist - they define each other
precisely by their contradictory co-existence. Probably what
Jordan means is that, unlike "normal" colonialism, in which a
national democratic state in the former colony might be
consolidated without the disappearance of the metropolitan ratate,
in South Africa this is impossible. One or the other has to be
"destroyed".
Once again, this makes a protracted process of revolutionary
reform unthinkable, a process in which there is ongoing struggle
for networks of power, in which there is, precisely, an unstable
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co-existence. Once again, Jordan's manner of posing the problem
makes the actual reality (he is currently serving in the cabinet
of national unity with former leading members of the old colonial
state) and the optimal manner of engaging with it over the coming
years, unthinkable.
Most seriously, this tendency, while arguing for mass
organisation and mobilisation, has consistently miscast the role
of such mobilisation. In the 1992 rolling mass actions there were
distinctly insurrectionist expectations in the movement. These
expectations were sometimes confusedly articulated, not least on
the eve of the fateful September 7 march on Bistro.
Insurrectionist rhetoric gave Brigadier Gqozo, his Ciskei
security forces and their SADF advisers the impression that they
could massacre marchers and get away with it. For a participant's
account and evaluation of the Bisho September march see Raymond
Suttner (1992)t
"there was [no] clarity as to the strategy and tactics
to be employed...Sometimes we spoke of the campaign
[in the Ciskei] as being for free political
activity...But a lot of our statements suggested that
we would occupy Bisho and thereby remove Gqozo. That
seemed to be the understanding of a lot of activists
and leadership of the alliance - at every level. And
this was expected to set in train a domino effect with
Mangope next and Buthelezi following. This was stated
by a number of leaders...
We had raised the temperature in the country, we had
put De Klerk under pressure, we had suggested that he
would have to choose between his puppet falling,
followed by others, or drown our peaceful action in
blood...We underestimated the bankruptcy of the
regime, its limited political choices and in so doing
we committed a very costly error." (p.23)
Suttner is certainly not excusing Gqozo and the security forces
involved in the massacre. But our own confused conception of what
we were doing tempted the other side into believing that it could
"teach us a lesson" and still occupy the moral high ground.
Following the Bisho events, our own 1992 rolling mass action
campaign faltered. Fortunately, although a lot of "middle" ground
opinion in South Africa (not least the Democratic Party) tried
to blame the AHC-alliance for the massacre, this interpretation
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did not quite stick. In any case, by the beginning of September,
the mass campaigns had already altered the balance of forces at
the negotiating table, as the September 26 1992 Record of
Understanding, between the ANC and De Klerk's government was to
confirm.
The Bis ho massacre, I believe, led to a clearer assessment within
the ANC leadership (amongst those who were most sympathetic to
mass mobilisation in the first place) of the nature, strengths,
limitations and objectives of mass action in the South African
transition. But insurrectionary hopes lingered on powerfully at
a more popular activist level. I am sure Theo Molaba was speaking
for many when he wrote some months lateri
"in the night vigil (at Hani's funeral) all the
regions were calling for revolutionary mass
action/war, with the exception of one or two regions.
The leadership is out of touch with these
sentiments...Chris Hani's funeral was an occasion to
prepare for insurrection, but our leadership failed."
(Molaba, p.18-9)
How realistic have these insurrectionary aspirations been in
practice? It is instructive, in this regard, to remember the
combination of forces at play in the mass uprising in March 1994
in Bophuthatswana. Was it an insurrection? Not really. Certainly
a decisive role was played by the wave of strikes by bantustan
civil servants (anxious that they would be peripheralised by the
upcoming changes in South Africa), militant actions by students,
and active collaboration with these forces by a growing number
of BDF troops. This mass uprising rapidly unlocked the
Bophuthatswana' situation, which had been deadlocked for months
in the negotiation process. There were insurrectionary features
in these events. But we should not allow ourselves to forget that
the situation was stabilised in favour of our main demands
(reincorporation of the territory into South Africa and
participation in elections) bv the entry of the SADF at the
request of the multi-partv. power-sharing Transitional Executive
Council, in co-operation with De Klerk's government. The mass
uprising was precipitated by the negotiated transition process,
and in turn, the process was advanced by the mass actions. Mass
23
action and negotiated arrangements worked together. A qualitative
transformation was secured, but it was hardly, nor could it be,
a seizure of power.
Representative democracy • bourgeois democracy?
The general weaknesses in the liberation paradigm considered so
far are also apparent in the attitude that both the African
national liberation movement and "marxist-leninist" paradigms
have tended to adopt towards parliamentary democracy. In his
polemic against Kautsky, ("The Proletarian Revolution and the
Renegade Kautsky") Lenin writes* "It is natural for a liberal to
speak of 'democracy' in general; but a Marxist will never forget
to aski 'for what class?'".
Fair enough. Clearly, the bourgeoisie, when and where it is
operating within a parliamentary system, seeks to use the system
to its advantage. But Lenin goes much further in this polemic,
mechanically equating particular forms of democracy with the rule
of a particular class. To do this he draws on a misleading
historical analogy, the democracy of slave cities and states,
which was a democracy for the slave owners and a dictatorship
over the slaves. (One could say the same of the whites-only
parliamentary Bystem that prevailed in South Africa for many
decades). Democracy, Lenin concludes, is always a form of class
dictatorship. There is slave-city democracy/dictatorship; there
is parliamentary democracy (<• bourgeois dictatorship); and there
is soviet democracy (° dictatorship of the proletariat).
This argument ignores the contradictory character of "bourgeois"
parliamentary democracy. Unlike slave-city democracy, or colonial
white minority democracy - it tends to include (more or less, the
degree being the outcome of struggle) the oppressed classes.
Rather than being a simple instrument of class oppression,
parliamentary democracy is a real site of contradiction and
struggle. (A point made interestingly, and eloquently, by Marx
in his Class Struggles in France - see Hunt 1980).
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Lenin's approach (and it has had many echoes within our own
liberation movement) undercuts the possibility of thinking a
transformative struggle on the terrain of a capitalist society,
in this case on the terrain of representative democracy. Iniitead,
working class democracy is posited as a wholly separate
institution (soviet democracy/dictatorship of the proletariat),
which smashes parliamentary democracy. The political project
becomes an external project, one form of democracy, consolidated
outside of the system, which seeks to abolish another.
One can actually see the uneasy and unresolved cohabitation of
this kind of thinking with the realities of representative
democracy in the following argument by Blade Nzimandet
"Our immediate goal should be the total defeat of the
National Party and the apartheid regime ...The first step
towards the total abolition of apartheid is the total and
decisive defeat of the National Party...If we decisively
defeat the National Party and its surrogates in a
democratic election let them become the opposition or
disappear from the face of a democratic South Africa."
(Nzimande 1992, p.22, my emphases).
Here the old paradigm is wrestling with the actual reality of an
engagement with electoral politics. Many of the characteristics
of the old paradigm are invoked nostalgically, like the all-in
moment (immediate, total, decisive, decisively), with its
difficulty in thinking of the co-existence of opposing forces.
There is also the invocation of an irreversible teleology, not
to mention a certain voluntarism* "let them... disappear". But
how? Unfortunately, none of this equips us to engage effectively
with, amongst other things, the realities of representative
democracy.
Politics from without
The inability to think adequately a revolutionary struggle on the
terrain of capitalism has, as I have said, tended to result in
conceptualising the struggle as one in which power is accumulated
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externally. Hence the notion of "dual power", two separate
powers, the State and the anti-State (the Soviets). In the
national liberation movement paradigm this dual power has often
been concretised in "liberated zones", and, perhaps even more,
in that other externality - the socialist bloc (the antithesis
to the colonial /imperialist powers). It was the existence of this
socialist bloc that enabled, so it was thought, post-liberation
African societies to transcend capitalism, to be Other, to pursue
an autonomous course in the realm of that awkward non-category,
the "non-capitalist" path (for an interesting contemporary
critique of this category see First 1991 and 1992).
Externality prevents us from developing an effective strategy of
engagement with the reality of a capitalist dominated world, and,
in our country, a capitalist dominated society. Yet, whether it
is in the defence of socialist gains like free health care, or
the right to work (as in Cuba, or Russia at present), or in the
attempt to progress towards a socialist democracy, there is no
meaningful alternative to a concrete, but transformative project,
on the actual capitalist dominated terrain in which we find
ourselves.
The Inevitable result of national liberation and
socialist thinking?
In 1991 Marina Ottaway was one of the few academic voices to be
sceptical about the relevance to South Africa of the "transition
to democracy" paradigm. Unfortunately her scepticism was not
rooted in a disagreement with the tenets of the paradigmi
"As an analytical model of what was happening in South
Africa...the transition-to-democracy paradigm was rather
questionable. The major problem was not that the National
Party still appeared determined to safeguard as much power
as possible for whites...Such resistance on the part of the
incumbent government and administration must be considered
normal. Rather, the relevance of the above paradigm was
challenged by the fact that the opposition organisations,
and above all the ANC, were liberation movements - and
nowhere in Africa have they spawned democratic regimes."
(Ottaway 1991, p.62)
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This is not a rejection of the principles of the low intensity
idemocracy paradigm. It is an argument about application. What
remains constant.is the cynicism. He are being told that national
Party anti-democratic obduracy back in 1991 "must be considered
normal" within the paradigm (an interesting reflection on the
paradigm). It is the ANC, because it is a liberation movement
that is, by paradigmatic definition, the real threat to
democracy.
I wonder whether in 1994 Ottaway would be prepared, in the face
of much counter-evidence, to argue her case as brazenly?
Nevertheless, Ottaway's views do present a challenge. Are the
flawed tendencies which I have enumerated above (teleology,
vanguardism, substitutionism, all-or-nothing reductionism,
rejection of representative democracy's pluralism) essential and
defining features of a national liberation movement as an
organisational form? I believe they are not, and I believe that
the actual practice of the ANC (as opposed to some of the ways
in which we have tried to conceptualise that practice) gives the
lie to Ottaway's dire predictions.
Liberation movement or political party?
But the question of the organisational means for deepening
democracy in South Africa is more than the simple liberation
movement versus political party debate to which Ottaway reduces
it. In the first place, it is one of the ironies of our
transition that it has not been the ANC liberation movement, but
the "political parties" (the NP, in particular) and the neo-
liberal theorists themselves who have lacked conviction in a
cornerstone of traditional parliamentary politics, namely an
effective opposition. It has been the NP and the neo-liberals who
have pushed for a government of national unity (GNU), a demand
which was, eventually, conceded by the ANC as a fiva-year
confidence building, transitional measure.
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Ottaway, with justification, points to the tendency of African
liberation movements to suppress oppositional parties in the name
of national unity in ethnically divided countries. Ironically,
the ANC's negotiation opponents have advanced precisely the same
arguments for a GNU here in South Africa. To be sure, the GNU is
multi-party in character, but clearly some of the traditional
features of parliamentary democracy are being curtailed in the
name of "nation building", and the need for "reconciliation".
These concerns are not necessarily wrong. They suggest that there
are objective political and institutional challenges at work in
newly independent, post-colonial African societies, including the
more anomalous South African case, which cannot be resolved
simply through multi-party representative democracy. This brings
me to a broader question:
Political formations and social movements
There is, indeed, much more at stake in the organisational
character of the ANC, and this relates to another and bigger
irony nestling in Ottaway's argument. Precisely at a time when
the ANC has been bombarded with advice to change itself into a
"normal political party", in the heartlands of representative
democracy, the party political form is in a state of considerable
malaise (Keane 1988; Arrighi et al. 1989; Mulgan 1994; Hirst
1994). Particularly in countries where representative democracy
has been institutionalised for decadest
"a huge gap has arisen between democracy as an ethos
and culture and democracy as a set of
institutions...All over the world, this gap is
fuelling political crisis. Germany's verdrosaenheit.
the collapse of old political systems in Italy and
Japan, the rise of business leaders like Berlusconi
and Peroti are all signs of societies struggling,
however messily, to achieve a politics that better
fits their needs. Everywhere the most dynamic
movements are negative onest the anti-government and
anti-mafia networks in Italy, the anti-EC movments in
Scandinavia, the hugely successful anti-smoking
campaigns in the US...In the UK, the main parties'
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memberships are IBBS than a third what they were in
the 1950s. Fewer than 5 per cent of their members are
under 26..." (Mulgan 1994, p.16).
The processes to which Nulgan is referring go back some two and
a half decades at least. 1968 was an important global moment in
which new social movements (anti-war, black power, life-style and
ecological) challenged party politics, not just in Paris, London,
Berlin, Los Angeles and Chicago, but also in Tokyo, Mexico City
and Prague.
The relationship of these new social movements to political
organisations and parties was, and has since been, complex and
often fraught. In some cases, like the German Greens, they have
themselves launched into electoral politics, with some initial
success, but with diminishing returns. Worldwide there are now,
however, important initiatives to find ways of interconnecting
parliamentary politics and social movements, experiment!! with
aggregating heterogeneity.
All of this is born of a sense of the limitations of the narrow
party political form, and the need to infuse politics with the
energies of autonomous social movements.
"In the coming period it will be more necessary than
ever to combine the organisational form of the •
political party with those of popular self-
organisation and self-help. Political struggle through
the Party with the sole or primary aim of achieving
state power should no longer be the central focus. On
the one hand, it remains essential not to default on
state power to the forces of exploitation and
oppression.. .On the other hand, it is imperative to go
beyond struggles within the framework of bourgeois
representative democracy by combining this level of
struggle with workers and popular direct democracy."
(Gills, Rocamora and Wilson 1993, p.31).
In South Africa we have a relatively unique situation. Our local
1968 was 1973 (the emergence of a new trade unionism, built
partly on old traditions) and 1976 (the students and workers
uprising). Mass sectoral and community based organisations have
been at the centre of the rolling semi-insurrectionary struggles
in our country through the 1980s. Increasingly, in the course of
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the 1980B, these formations gravitated towards the broad ANC-
fold, not without contradictions and problems. But the
gravitation was (and is) essentially positive and crucial to the
ongoing transformation tasks.
The challenges facing South Africa are complex. They include
broad national unity and the consolidation of democratic
institutions, but not at the price of failing to carry through
socio-economic reconstruction'and development (a failure that
would destabilise the new political institutions themselves).
These core challenges point to the need for effective governance,
and effective social movements. The need for co-ordination of
effort and resources, but not the stifling of community and
sectoral based organisation and empowerment. The neo-liberal
appeal for the transformation of the ANC into a "normal political
party" is, consciously or otherwise, an agenda to deprive the ANC
of its principal strengthi its mass support, its relative
rootedness in oppressed communities, its internal dynamic of
unity and diversity (class, ethnic, sectoral and ideological).
Deprived of its liberation movement character, the ANC in
government would quickly become, at worst a neo-colonial
bureaucracy, and at best another third world "centre left" party,
which, in government, would simply implement the same structural
adjustment programme as its centre right parliamentary rival (see
for instance, the recent history of Peru, Frank, 1993, p.41-2).
This is the more or less explicit agenda underpinning the
Business Day's editorial comment on the April elections<
"Eventually the ANC will need to develop a role as
broadly popular party of the centre capable of
building a strong economy while retaining [that is,
'delivering'] mass support. This may eventually cost
the party a radical wing which tires of power-sharing.
The gains [for whom? - JC] will more than compensate."
(May 2, 1994)
One should add, that precisely at the time when "transition to
democracy" pundits are encouraging political movements in the
third world to transform themselves narrowly into electoral
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parties to compete for office in national government*!, the
accompanying neo-liberal economic programme is weakening the
sovereignty and capacity of national governments - through
privatisation, enforced cuts on social spending, tax reduction,
and the opening up of local markets to the unfettered
intervention of the multinationals. Cut loose from their social
movements, progressive governing parties find themselves holding
increasingly weakened institutional power in the face of global
realitiesi
"Host Third World governments today are weak because
they lack the support of their own people. Civil
society and popular organisations must grow in
autonomy in order to build strong government and to
articulate the interests of the majority..." (Gills,
Rocamara and Wilson 1993, p.29)
Progressive governance requires an effective and self-mobilised
social base.
On the other hand, deprived of a political movement. the mass
sectoral and community based organisations that emerged in the
1970s and 1980s could be fragmented and marginalised, reduced to
watch-dogs and lobby-groups, like so many of their counterparts
in the advanced capitalist countries. In this version they serve,
at least in the neo-liberal and older modernising theories, to
establish "cross-cutting allegiances", thus blunting the edge of
a majority politics.
This is not to say that the dynamic interconnection between the
political formation and social movement is not often, in
progressive cases, contradictory and fraught with many problems.
The re-emergence of a legal ANC in 1990, badly unsettled the mass
democratic movement - partly, through deliberate demobilisation
("the community and sectoral formations were just a stand-in for
the banned movement, now we're back in business there is no need
for any autonomous existence"); partly through the loss of key
cadres into full-time ANC work, which nonetheless greatly
strengthened the ANC; and partly through the reduction of vibrant
sectoral formations .into leagues of the ANC and platforms to
spring leaderships into national politics. (For comparative
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material from other third world struggles see Burbach 6 Nunez
1987; Alvarez 6 Escobar 1992; Rocamara 1992 6 1993; Bendana 1993;
Harnecker 1990; and Gonzales 1992).
Rethinking what we are doing
It is essential that we engage critically with our theoretical
heritage. There are many assumptions within this heritage which
are plainly inadequate to our present situation (and indeed to
any situation). Over the past three or four years, fortunately,
a number of interventions have begun to offer a theoretical
perspective, from within a revolutionary socialist standpoint,
that is more adequate to our reality, and to our often un- or
maltheorised practice. Among the contributions one could mention
Saul 1992; Webster 6 von Holdt 1992; Godongwana 1992; and Zita
1993. Some of this work draws on Poulantzas (1978) and on
Kagarlitsky (1990). But, above all, it draws upon considerable
South African struggle experience over the last decade and a
half. While not all of those mentioned agree on everything, they
Bhare a basic way of approaching the struggle, which seeks to
avoid the twin dangers of mere reformism, on the one hand, and
the subordination of everything to the logic of a grand moment,
the panacea (that never comes).
This is not the place to review this literature in any detail,
I refer to it. to acknowledge a debt, particularly in regard to
its attempt to theorise an active revolutionary engagement with
a complex transition process. Amongst other things, this approach
enables us better to take democracy seriously.
Taking up the challenge of democracy
Both within the national liberation and "marxist-leninist"
paradigms there has been a lacuna in regard to political
democracy. The neo-liberal "transition to democracy" paradigm
has, in the 1990s, seized on this lacuna, and on the yearnings
of people worldwide, and not least in the third world and in the
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former second world, for greater democracy. As I have tried to
argue already, this neo-liberal model is not very democratic, and
it certainly will not meet the broad popular aspirations of
people, either for political democracy, or for broad social and
economic transformation.
He must not throw away our national liberation movement, or a
class analysis, or a commitment to socialism. Nor, on the other
hand, is the existence of a neo-liberal agenda a reason to simply
dismiss actual negotiated transitions to democracy, as if our
neo-liberal opponents' agenda was bound to win out - this is a
tendency in some left positions (see, for instance, Mckinley
1994; and Frank 1993). The challenge is to engage with the
democratic transition process, with a perspective (and a
movement) that is more democratic, more far-reaching in its
popular empowerment implications, a perspective that extends
political democracy beyond the critically important institutions
of representative democracy to embrace direct and participatory
forms as well. And we need to extend democracy beyond political
institutions, into the social and the economic.
Broadly speaking, this is precisely the direction in which the
ANC-alliance's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is
pointing, with its commitment to "a people-driven process"!
"Development is not about the delivery of goods to a
passive, citizenry. It is about active involvement and
growing empowerment. In taking this approach wa are
building on the many forums, peace structures and
negotiations that our people are involved in throughout the
land." (p.5)
The RDP also links reconstruction and development to the
deepening of democracyt
"Thoroughgoing democratisation of our society
is.. .absolutely integral to the whole RDP. The RDP requires
fundamental changes in the way that policy is made and
programmes are implemented. Above all, the people affected
must participate in decision-making. Democratisation must
begin to transform both the state and civil society.
Democracy is not confined to periodic elections. It is,
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rather, an active process enabling everyone to contribute
to reconstruction and development." (p.7).
(For more detailed elaboration of direct and participatory forms
of democracy and the role of mass and community based
organisations see also SANCO 1994, and ANC/SACP/COSATU 1994).
In the past we tended to conceptualise change as a struggle to
capture the commanding heights, as a struggle to nationalise
ownership and control. We will be more faithful to the
fundamentals of our national liberation and socialist heritage,
and more useful to the actual tasks at hand, if we begin to
think, as the RDP starts to think, of the main task as being
about democratising power. All power.
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